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INTRODUCTION 
 China’s phenomenal growth over the last three decades has come at 
a well-documented price. High profile environmental disasters and the 
nation’s pollution problems leading up to the Beijing Olympics have 
exposed the world to the problems China faces internally. With so much 
attention being paid to these domestic issues, it is easy to overlook the 
other side of China’s environmental footprint: the country’s rapid growth 
has required unprecedented levels of resource consumption, and China is 
now reaching into the farthest corners of the globe in its search for raw 
materials. The finished products available on store shelves around the 
world may be labeled “Made in China,” but they began as copper from 
mines in Zambia, timber from dwindling swathes of rainforest in Gabon 
and Guinea, and iron from the Congolese jungle—all shipped to China 
and forged into products using oil from Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria.  
 This article focuses on this aspect of the supply chain. During the 
last decade, China has forged close trade relationships with the many 
developing African nations that are eager to capitalize on their natural 
resources. This eagerness for foreign investment, however, can have 
disastrous effects on the local environment. As Sino-African trade 
relations continue to expand, China, African nations, and the 
international community must develop a more effective environmental 
regulatory system in order to protect local environments from 
irresponsible corporate development. 
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 This article identifies the array of environmental problems 
surrounding Chinese resource extraction in these developing nations and 
recommends reasonable and potentially effective legal solutions. Part I 
provides background on China’s consumption of African resources and 
the negative effects the trade relationship has on the environment in 
Africa. Part II explains why traditional legal regimes are often 
inadequate to address the issues that arise in international resource 
extraction projects. Part III examines the roles of each of the Chinese 
bureaus and agencies that influence or regulate foreign investments. Part 
IV explains the common goals that might be achieved if these 
departments emphasized responsible corporate conduct abroad. Part V 
considers several approaches that might help reduce the negative 
environmental impacts associated with the growing trade relationship 
between China and African nations. We hope that this analysis can 
provide policymakers with some new ideas and approaches, so we have 
focused our efforts on developing suggestions that are realistic and take 
into account the unique circumstances of both Chinese and African 
governance.1 
 It is important to stress at the outset that China is by no means the 
only nation whose corporations have caused environmental destruction 
in developing nations. American and European explorers and 
corporations have exploited developing nations for centuries, and there is 
plenty of literature available detailing these investments and activities. 
However, China’s shifting role in the global economy—from capital-
recipient to capital-exporter—is just beginning and is therefore ripe for 
both discussion and early policy implementation that might help all 
parties achieve short and long term goals. 
I. SINO-AFRICAN TRADE  
A. China’s Expansion into Africa 
 Trade between China and Africa has flourished primarily as a result 
of China’s expanding need for raw materials and African nations’ hunger 
                                                 
1. Additionally, we have constrained our analysis to legal and governmental issues, thereby 
excluding several topics that are closely linked to the problems we will identify. Most noticeably, we 
have refrained from delving too deeply into international law regimes and the voluntary measures 
that corporations use to hold themselves to a higher standard of conduct than is legally required. 
Many Chinese corporations have signed onto the U.N. Global Compact, for example, and adopted 
internal systems to minimize their impacts overseas. While these kinds of initiatives and partner-
ships will be an important part of China’s global corporate citizenship going forward, our goal has 
been to focus on legal and governmental actions rather than to analyze every possible method that 
could help address this daunting problem. This narrow focus will allow us to provide more concrete 
analysis and recommendations for policy planners and regulators both in China and abroad. 
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for capital investment.2 China is currently the top consumer worldwide 
of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc, iron ore, coal, wheat, rice, 
palm oil, cotton, and rubber.3 It has been the world’s leading consumer 
and producer of steel for over a decade, producing approximately one-
third of the world’s total output, three times the amount of the United 
States or Japan.4 All of this production and growth have also vaulted 
China into the upper echelon of energy and oil consumers, second only 
to the United States.5 Clearly, all of this consumption is a result of the 
increased production of finished goods, stainless steel, electrical wiring, 
cable and infrastructure that have occurred in China throughout the last 
few decades. With GDP and per capita income still on the rise, demand 
will only increase in the foreseeable future.  
 The dichotomy is clear: Chinese corporations are flush with cash 
from years of unprecedented growth and eager to secure long-term 
access to the minerals and fuel that will be the lifeblood of its production 
economy for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the African 
continent holds some of the richest resource reserves on Earth, but many 
of its nations remain among the world’s poorest.6 The result is a 
marriage of opportunity between some of the most notoriously unstable 
and corrupt governments in the world and Chinese companies seeking 
access to the resources those governments control.  
 Thus, China—a relatively new player in the game of international 
resource acquisition—has worked hard to cultivate its relationships with 
the African nations that are capable of providing the resources it needs. 
Because outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) emanating from 
China was limited to a few government run companies until the mid-
1980s, the Chinese business behemoth was not turned loose on the global 
acquisitions market until just two decades ago. As a result, the vast 
majority of accessible resource reserves were already in the hands of 
major multinationals—many of them based in Europe or the United 
States—by the time Chinese companies began searching for foreign 
supplies of oil and minerals. Many of the available reserves that were not 
already depleted were (and still are) located in less developed or volatile 
                                                 
2. TAMARA TRINH ET AL., CHINA’S COMMODITY HUNGER, IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA AND 
LATIN AMERICA 2 (Maria L.Lanzeni ed., Deutsch Bank Research 2006).  
3. Daniel Griswold, Director, Ctr. for Trade Policy Studies, Cato Inst., Address to the Annual 
Meeting of TEGMA/CMC, The Competition for World Resources: China's Demand for Commodi-
ties (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10906. 
4. Id. 
5. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: CHINA (May 2011), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Full.html.  
6. Econ. & Soc. Council of the United Nations, Least Developed Countries, NATIONS ONLINE 
PROJECT, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/least_developed_countries.htm (last visited Feb. 
29, 2012). 
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nations in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Chinese firms took 
advantage of these openings by making overtures to nations that many 
Western companies had ignored or avoided because of concerns over the 
safety of their investments or the perceived problems of doing business 
with unstable or undemocratic governments.7  
 The Chinese government itself paved the way for many of these 
arrangements, both by offering incentives for Chinese firms to “go 
global”8 in their hunt for resources, and by cultivating relationships with 
the governments of African nations like Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria, all 
of which are now major oil suppliers to China.9 China holds a great deal 
of African debt as well, which the State Council regularly refinances or 
forgives outright when it seeks to gain good will or needs a bargaining 
chip with a debtor nation.10 Finally, Chinese government officials have 
signed off on dozens of commodities agreements that guarantee access or 
fixed prices to Chinese firms in exchange for Chinese-financed or 
constructed infrastructure projects. Widely known as “oil-for-
infrastructure,” these arrangements are seen by both sides as the most 
efficient way to provide what each nation needs most. They have become 
routine in almost every African nation with which China enjoys 
significant financial ties. 
 These financial ties are indeed profound. “More than 800 Chinese 
State-owned companies are managing about 900 projects in Africa, many 
of them in the oil industry. Last year Sino-African trade was $106.8 
billion U.S., ten times the level of 2000 and more than double the value 
of bilateral trade in 2006.”11 The benefits flow both ways, however. 
While China enjoys increased access to much needed resources, African 
                                                 
7. A prime example is China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) expanded operations 
in Sudan in the wake of Western withdrawals during that nation’s brutal civil war. See Erica Downs, 
The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations, 3 CHINA SEC. 42, 58–62 (2007) (describing 
CNPC’s role in Sudan). 
8. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), OECD INVESTMENT POLICY REVIEWS: 
CHINA, ENCOURAGING RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 83 (2008) [hereinafter OECD REVIEW].  
9. China’s top five trading partners—Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, and the 
Republic of Congo—contribute more than eighty percent of Chinese imports from Africa. TRINH, 
supra note 2, at 6.  
10. INYAMBO MWANAWINA, AFRICAN ECON. RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, CHINA-AFRICA 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: THE CASE OF ZAMBIA 20 (2008), available at http://www.aercafrica.org/do
cuments/china_africa_relations/Zambia.pdf. 
11. Jonathan Manthorpe, The Party's Over for Chinese in Africa, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 4, 
2009. Lest we get too caught up in the bandwagon of commentators who frantically opine that Chi-
na’s buying power is cutting other nations out of the picture, it is worth remembering that “China is 
only the third largest market for Africa’s oil exports, accounting for 12.5%, behind the US (31.8%) 
and EU (31.5%).” Tom Orlick, Hu Jintao: ‘Every time I go to Africa I feel like I am going home’, 
CHINA TRANSLATED (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.chinatranslated.com/?p=178. 
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nations receive many of the goods and services they need to raise 
standards of living.12  
 Furthermore, Chinese corporations are able to provide these 
services quickly and without the transparency and red tape that Western 
corporations require for major OFDIs. These procedural and substantive 
hurdles have, for better or worse, long prevented African nations from 
carrying out some major projects, but African nations have now found 
partners in Chinese business and government who are willing to make 
deals without imposing stringent conditions related to human rights, the 
environment, and corruption. While this approach does indeed increase 
the availability of financing and investment, it very likely does so at the 
expense of laborers and the environment. 
B. Causes for Concern 
 While there are undoubtedly many Chinese companies operating 
responsibly in Africa, the increased corporate activity raises new 
environmental concerns. It is not that Chinese firms are any hungrier for 
profits than their Western counterparts, but that they are doing business 
under fundamentally different circumstances that pose unique threats to 
the environment. This section identifies these unique concerns.13 
1. China’s Environmental Track Record at Home 
 China’s limited success dealing with environmental issues 
domestically does not bode well for its foreign operations.14 From 
everyday air pollution that threatened to scuttle the 2008 Olympic 
Games, to the high-profile benzene spill in the Songhua River that forced 
over ten thousand residents to evacuate, China’s domestic struggles are 
well-documented and need not be detailed here.15 Worth noting, 
however, are a few of the major issues that hamper efforts to address 
                                                 
12. In fact, China may be better suited than entrenched Western MNCs to develop practical so-
lutions for the problems facing African nations because China faces many of the same challenges. 
Currently the worldwide leader in solar technologies, for example, China will be an essential partner 
in the quest to provide rural African communities with electricity. Peter Bosshard, John Hopkins 
Univ., China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa 4 (Sch. of Advanced Stud., Working Paper No. 
01-08, 2008), available at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sebin/i/f/BosshardWorkingPaper.pdf. 
13. See id. at 5 (providing an abbreviated version of this discussion that was a primary source 
for the issues laid out in this section). 
14. See id. (“China’s domestic policies have prioritized economic growth over the protection 
of the environment, with harrowing results.”); ELIZABETH ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK 248 
(2004) (generalizing about the priorities and general mentality of many Chinese decision-makers). 
15. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kirschner & Edward B. Grandy, Songhua River Spill: China’s Pollution 
Crisis, 20 NAT. RESOURCE & ENV’T 66 (Spring 2006) (describing the Songhua spill in detail); see 
generally ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 59–91 (thoroughly discussing the issues that plague envi-
ronmental enforcement in China). 
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pollution domestically because these are the problems that China risks 
exporting as it expands into less-developed nations.  
 First, China’s environmental laws lack the level of detail required 
for meaningful accountability and enforcement. Additionally, 
government officials often fail to prioritize environmental enforcement 
because polluting industries typically provide many local jobs and 
government revenues.16 Even when local officials want to confront a 
problem, they may be hindered by a lack of resources or authority, as 
many governments have allies in higher reaches of government who can 
prevent effective regulation.17 Finally, the system is permeated by a lack 
of understanding of environmental issues and the associated health and 
safety risks, making it difficult to convince anyone with authority to take 
meaningful action.18 These problems also exist—often to an even worse 
degree—in the host nations where Chinese corporations are establishing 
so many operations, as described below. 
2. Activities in Particularly Sensitive Places 
 Because of China’s late entry into the global resource market, its 
companies are gaining access to many previously undeveloped areas. 
Extractive industries typically carry above average environmental risks, 
but Chinese investors are developing projects in remote and previously 
untouched areas that are likely to be very sensitive to disturbances.19 
While it may be possible to exploit resources in these areas responsibly, 
China’s domestic track record does not give critics reason to believe that 
it will value environmental concerns over financial gain as its 
corporations continue to drill, chop, and mine the African backcountry. 
 This concern came to the forefront in 2006, when one of China’s 
largest oil companies attempted to set up operations in Gabon’s Loango 
National Park.20 Loango has been described as one of the last untouched 
paradises on earth—a lush coastal preserve where extremely rare wildlife 
species wander the beaches, blissfully unaware of humankind’s 
existence. It is home to healthy populations of endangered lowland 
gorillas and elephants, as well as manatees that breed in the crystal clear 
waters off its coast. In 2006, scientists working in Loango reported that 
                                                 
16. ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 200. 
17. ERICA DOWNS, BROOKINGS INST., BROOKINGS FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, ENERGY 
SECURITY SERIES: CHINA 16−24 (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/
rc/reports/2006/12china/12china.pdf (noting, for example, that “[t]he general managers of China’s 
[national oil companies] . . . have direct access to the country’s senior leadership . . . .”). 
18. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 265–67. 
19. Bosshard, supra note 12, at 5. 
20. Chris Haslam, Oil Prospecting in Gabon, WILDLIFE EXTRA NEWS, Oct. 2006, 
http://www.wildlifeextra.com/go/news/gabon-oil.html#cr. 
350 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:343 
Sinopec contractors had entered the park and were employing destructive 
exploratory tactics, including dynamiting gorilla habitat and a manatee 
breeding site.21 One professor commented: 
They're using dynamite, which is killing and scaring the wildlife, 
sending the gorillas deeper into the forest and outside the protection 
of the park where they risk becoming bushmeat. They're bulldozing 
roads through the park, polluting the waters with chemicals and 
slurry and hunting the wildlife to eat . . . . I don't want to forbid the 
Gabonese from profiting from petrol but modern techniques exist, 
like horizontal drilling that would allow the oil to be extracted 
without setting foot in the park.22 
Sinopec was ultimately forced out of Loango before they were able to 
cause the extensive damage that conservationists and scientists feared, 
but similar problems can occur wherever corporations move into 
previously untouched lands and virgin forests. With Chinese acquisitions 
rapidly expanding into these areas, immediate and irreparable damage is 
likely. 
3. Sensitive Nature of the Projects and Investments 
 Because China’s investments in Africa are so heavily concentrated 
in natural resource extraction, Chinese corporations tend to have a 
disproportionately large impact on the environment of host nations. For 
example, mining and oil exploration entail significant levels of blasting, 
seismic testing, and pollution, all of which can affect local ecosystems to 
varying degrees.  
 The town of Kabwe, Zambia exemplifies the dangers of 
irresponsible mining. This town, in the heart of the Zambia’s Copperbelt, 
has for decades suffered from highly toxic lead dust and sulfur dioxide 
fumes emitted from the smelters nearby.23 Barefoot children play on 
mounds of poisonous waste, while citizens pick through the rubble 
searching for scraps of metal they might be able to sell for a few 
pennies.24 As a result, the level of lead in citizens’ blood is five to ten 
times that which the U.S. government would consider safe.25 In spite of 
all this, the Zambian government continues to welcome investors, 
                                                 
21. Id. 
22. Id. (quoting Christophe Boesch). 
23. Danstan Kaunda, Zambia Penalizes Chinese Investors for Pollution, VOICE OF AMERICA, 
June 12, 2007, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1287300591.html. 
24. Penny Dale, Zambia's Child Poisoning Tragedy, BBC, Nov. 6, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/africa/ 3241037.stm. 
25. Id. 
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offering tax breaks and waivers to anyone willing to invest in Zambian 
mines.26  
 While not responsible for the appalling conditions that exist today, 
Chinese firms have expanded into Zambia rapidly, often rekindling the 
same problems that have earned Kabwe its title as the fourth most-
polluted place in the world.27 A mine run by Chiman Manufacturing, 
Ltd., in particular, has been criticized repeatedly for failing to control air 
and water pollution at its smelter and dumpsites. Though town officials 
repeatedly “urged” Chiman to address the problems after it began 
operations several years ago, Chiman’s smelter continued to pollute the 
town with relative impunity.28 
4. Lack of Environmental Safeguards in Associated Projects 
 Mines and smelters like those described above are obvious 
pollution sources. However, Chinese companies are often involved in 
massive construction projects that may result in less apparent 
environmental impacts. Companies carry out these projects both to 
facilitate the extractive process and as a form of compensation for the 
right to operate in the host counties, an arrangement often referred to as 
“oil-for-infrastructure.”29 In September 2007, for example, China agreed 
to finance thousands of miles of roads and railways in Congo in 
exchange for 10 million metric tons of copper and 600,000 tons of 
cobalt.30 These oil-for-infrastructure contracts are popular with local 
governments because they provide much needed infrastructure and 
construction jobs.31  
 However, the projects often have negative consequences that are 
not adequately considered.32 Traditionally, developing nations relied 
                                                 
26. Chris Mfula, Zambia Won’t Reintroduce High Mine Taxes, REUTERS, Dec.12, 2009, 
http://af.reuters.com/article/zambiaNews/idAFGEE5BB09G20091212. The tax incentives are still in 
place.  
27. Kabwe, Africa's Most Toxic City, IRIN NEWS, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/Repo
rt.aspx?ReportId=61521. The three cities topping the list of the world's most toxic sites ahead of 
Kabwe are Chernobyl, Dzerzhinsk (a Russian, Cold War-era chemical weapons production facility), 
and Haina, Dominican Republic, “where emissions from an old car battery smelter have caused 
almost the entire population of 85,000 to suffer from lead poisoning.” Id. 
28. Reduce Air Pollution, Chinese Firm Urged, THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA, Feb. 11, 2008, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200802110293.html. 
29. New Trends in Financing Infrastructure, FUTURE CHALLENGES (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://futurechallenges.org/searchlight/new-trends-in-financing-infrastructure/. 
30. GLOBAL WITNESS, CHINA AND CONGO: FRIENDS IN NEED, A REPORT ON THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 9 (Mar. 2011), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/friends
_in_need_en_lr.pdf. 
31. See FUTURE CHALLENGES, supra note 29. 
32. See MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 10–11 (describing the lack of coordination among bu-
reaucratic officials and contractors and the poor construction that results). 
352 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:343 
upon international lending institutions to finance the large scale projects 
now being built or financed by the Chinese. These international 
institutions, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the 
World Bank Group, have adopted environmental guidelines that projects 
must meet in order to receive financing. Chinese investors and suppliers 
often do not have guidelines or standards that are consistent with 
international standards.33 Consequently, many of these projects never 
receive the kind of environmental review that international institutions 
require, such as environmental impact assessments (EIAs).34   
 On the other hand, the transparency and environmental standards 
that Western institutions tend to enforce have prevented many African 
projects from going forward.35 By lowering or eliminating these 
standards, Chinese corporations and financiers allow African leaders to 
pursue projects they believe will help their communities.36 From the 
African perspective, this allows leaders to achieve their development 
goals with few strings attached.37 
II. LEGAL DIFFICULTIES REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION 
BY FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
 It is clear that the environmental consequences of corporate 
activities abroad can lead to serious problems for local residents and 
ecosystems. Less clear is how those affected can successfully intervene 
to stop or mitigate the damage, or to seek compensation after the fact. 
Traditional legal regimes are generally inadequate for dealing with 
instances of malfeasance by both Chinese and multinational corporations 
(MNCs). 
A. Domestic Law in Host Nations 
 Although all foreign investors are subject to the control of the host 
State, it is often very difficult to enforce environmental laws against 
                                                 
33. Bosshard, supra note 12, at 5. 
34. GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 30, at 35. 
35. MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 21 (“All Zambia[n] agreements with China are confiden-
tial, making them closed to public scrutiny and at variance with both China’s and Zambia’s in-
creased commitment to openness and public transparency and accountability.”). 
36. Id. at 6 (specifically noting that the Chinese traditionally fund Zambian “projects [that] 
other donors are not interested in”).  
37. See Bosshard, supra note 12, at 6–8. This is how the Sudanese government, for example, 
finally obtained financing to build the Merowe Dam on the Nile, a project that was uniformly reject-
ed by major Western financiers because of its severe social and environmental impacts. Believing 
that the potential benefits of the project were worth the risks, the Sudanese government eventually 
received funding from China’s Ex-Im Bank, the largest foreign aid bank in China, and hired China 
International Water and Electric Corporation to build the dam. The closed-door planning process 
resulted in several blatant breaches of accepted international environmental standards.  
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foreign firms in developing nations.38 Prior to entering the market, 
foreign firms must comply with all national foreign investment laws 
governing entry, “which not only provide for guarantees against 
expropriation[,] . . . dispute settlement, and tax and non-tax incentives, 
but also detail a screening process of entry through administrative 
agencies and often require a feasibility study . . . [which] may include an 
EIA.”39 During the life of the project, investing companies must also 
continue to “abide by all national laws and regulations—including 
environmental ones, as the investor voluntarily subjects himself to 
regime of the host State by making entry into it.”40 Nevertheless, 
problems arise during both phases. 
1. Compromises at Entry into the Market 
 The fierce competition for investment in developing countries can 
significantly affect the terms under which investors operate. First, 
national entry regulations are often lax or vague.41 Even basic 
requirements, such as EIAs, may be little more than mere formalities or 
overlooked entirely.42 Second, the host nation’s desire for capital 
investment generally puts the potential investor at a substantial 
bargaining advantage. During negotiations, a potential investor may 
extract from the host nation numerous contractual guarantees that protect 
the investor’s money and property, but which can prevent the host nation 
from enforcing or enacting meaningful environmental standards.43  
                                                 
38. ELISA MORGERA, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 25 (2009). 
39. Id. at 26. 
40. Id. 
41. MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 10 (stating unequivocally that Zambia “lacks laws and 
systems which are results oriented and accountable”).  
42. While most nations appear to have laws that require EIAs for major projects, few have any 
authoritative or meaningful guidelines for these reports, so it is not unusual for an EIA to be inade-
quate or even entirely inaccurate. Objective oversight or review by third parties is not required, and 
internal review by a host State’s environmental officials is not guaranteed even when required by 
local law. See Bosshard, supra note 12, at 7 (describing the shortcomings in the Sudanese dam envi-
ronmental impact assessment). 
43. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 27. Even beyond these specific agreements, there are interna-
tional conventions dealing with the protection of alien property, and expropriation of assets is con-
sidered a breach of customary international law. It is important to note that these issues are regularly 
enforced at an international level: investor protections have “been gradually extended from tangible 
assets to cover . . . other investors’ rights, thus limiting the sovereignty of host States over their 
natural resources, and enlarging the sphere of corporate interests protected at the international level.” 
Id. at 51. This begs the question of why wealthy international investors have been given forums and 
mechanisms to protect their investments, while poor host nations have no comparable way to protect 
their communities from environmental destruction. 
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 An example of one seemingly innocuous provision with potentially 
far-reaching environmental consequences is the “stabilization clause.”44 
Stabilization clauses “seek to freeze the laws of the host State as at the 
time of entry so that the operating conditions of the foreign investment 
process will remain constant throughout the life of the foreign 
investment contract.”45 Such contractual provisions severely restrict the 
right of the host nation to update, enact, or enforce environmental laws 
that might apply to the foreign investors’ operations.46 
2. Lack of Local Enforcement 
 Host State legal systems often do not have adequate mechanisms 
for ensuring that foreign firms operate in an environmentally responsible 
way. Local officials rarely have any incentive to crack down on 
industrial polluters because these companies are often the financial 
lifeblood of the community, providing much of the tax base and 
employment in the area.47 In some nations, concessions from these 
MNCs constitute a significant portion of the national GDP, so there is 
incentive to look the other way.48 Even when officials act in good faith, 
they may be hampered by a lack of enforcement resources, technological 
ability, and awareness of risks.49 Finally, the potential legal 
consequences stemming from violations of regulations that are enforced 
are often insufficient to motivate compliance. 
3. Difficulty of Pursuing a Legal Claim 
 Compounding the problem are numerous obstacles that prevent 
plaintiffs from successfully asserting civil claims in response to 
environmental harm. Plaintiffs may lack standing to challenge a general 
harm inflicted on a region, particularly when the harms alleged are not 
specific to the individual or causation is difficult to prove.50 What cause 
                                                 
44. Id. at 27. 
45. Id. 
46. Even when this might otherwise be construed as a non-compensable regulatory taking, re-
cent international law cases have indicated that an environmental regulation can, in some cases, 
“constitute an act ‘tantamount to expropriation.’ ” Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 ILM 35.  
47. MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 10 (noting that Zambia, at least, “is a place where you 
keep your job by not doing it.”). 
48. As an example, a Canadian MNC operating a gold mine in Guyana provided twenty per-
cent of that nation’s GDP in 1995 when it was sued for damages related to a massive spill into Guy-
ana’s Essequibo River. The Canadian court hearing the case acknowledged serious concerns regard-
ing the fairness of proceedings involving such an influential entity in Guyana. Recheres Internacion-
ales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., 1998 QJ N2554 (QL). 
49. MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 10.  
50. Id. at 29. 
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of action, for example, could a concerned citizen have brought to try to 
stop Sinopec’s blasting in Loango National Park?  
 Even if local plaintiffs succeed in asserting a claim, they are usually 
underfunded and dependent upon legal aid that may not be available.51 
Chinese multinationals, on the other hand, have the resources to defend 
themselves and are likely to structure their deals in ways that limit 
liability. A host nation’s court may not be able to assert jurisdiction over 
a Chinese parent company at all, and even it did, judgments would be 
difficult to enforce either in the host nation or in China.52 As a practical 
matter, local plaintiffs are simply unlikely to obtain adequate remedies or 
damages from Chinese corporations in host nation courts. 
B. Foreign Direct Liability 
 Because redressing environmental harms can be particularly 
difficult in host nations, it is sometimes more effective for the home 
State to regulate its corporations’ activities abroad, which is known as 
foreign direct liability. This concept encompasses both extraterritorial 
regulation, wherein subsidiaries acting abroad are forced to abide by the 
laws of the home State, and also home State liability, which allows host 
nation citizens to seek damages from foreign corporations in the 
corporation’s home State.53 
1. Extraterritorial Regulation 
 There are several practical difficulties with applying home State 
law to activities occurring abroad. First, it is important to remember that 
home States are permitted to exercise jurisdiction over their MNCs 
abroad.54 Even developing nations that typically object to international 
interference in domestic affairs, such as China and India, have 
occasionally expressed support for the idea that a MNC’s home 
government “should also undertake obligations, including . . . ensur[ing] 
that the investor’s behavior and practices are in line with and contribute 
to the interests and development of policies of the host [State].”55 U.N. 
                                                 
51. ALICE PALMER, FOUND. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & DEV., COMMUNITY REDRESS 
AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 8 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.field.org.uk/files/Com
munity_redress.pdf. 
52. Id. at 10. 
53. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 131. 
54. See Christen Broecker, “Better the Devil You Know”: Home State Approaches to Transna-
tional Corporate Accountability, 41 J. INT’L L. & POL. 159, 178–79 (2008) (briefly describing the 
legitimate bases for extraterritorial regulation). 
55. World Trade Organization, Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and In-
vestment: Communication from China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe—Investors’ 
and Home Governments’ Obligations, WTO Doc WT/WGTI/W/152 (2002); see also MORGERA, 
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Special Representative John Ruggie, the head of U.N. initiatives 
regarding transnational corporations and human rights, has also indicated 
“that extraterritorial regulation by home States of TNCs headquartered in 
their territories is permissible under international law and may even be 
desirable in some circumstances.”56  
 Nevertheless, the fact that such regulation is permissible does not 
make it particularly practical. Many significant obstacles impede a home 
State’s ability to oversee corporate activities effectively in foreign states. 
First, the host State may view such intervention in its internal affairs 
with suspicion and could even prevent the home State from exercising 
effective control by asserting its own right to national sovereignty.57 
Second, a host nation that permits such intrusion risks establishing a 
system in which MNCs in the same industry operate “subject to different 
environmental regulations depending on their country of origin.”58 The 
host country would face tremendous regulatory and enforcement 
challenges in such a system.  
 On the other hand, the home nation may not exercise effective 
control either. In a nation like China, for example, competing 
bureaucratic interests, devolved enforcement authority, lack of interest 
and knowledge on environmental issues, and vague laws all conspire to 
prevent effective regulation of foreign activities.59 Courts around the 
world have been extremely reluctant to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in environmental damage cases, precisely because the issues 
involved are generally so local in nature.60 Given the difficulties that 
plague environmental enforcement within China, it is particularly 
difficult to imagine the Chinese government creating or exercising 
effective enforcement mechanisms that could stem pollution and 
resource damage in distant and less developed nations. On a deeper 
level, there is very little culture of compliance within China, nor any 
meaningful sense of responsibility for corporate actions abroad.61  This 
mentality poses a difficult obstacle for effective home State regulation. 
                                                                                                             
supra note 38, at 30–34 (describing both the theoretical and practical problems with home State 
control and extraterritoriality). 
56. Broecker, supra note 54, at 177 (citing Mr. Ruggie).  
57. PALMER, supra note 51, at 12. 
58. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 31. 
59. See generally ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 59-91(thoroughly examining the ineffectiveness 
of China’s environmental laws and general disinterest in environmental policy). 
60. See Jennifer. K Rankin, U.S. Laws in the Rainforest: Can a U.S. Court Find Liability for 
Extraterritorial Pollution Caused by a US Corporation? An Analysis of Aguindo v. Texaco, Inc., 18 
BC INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 251 (1995) (noting the aversion that U.S. courts seem to have 
against recognizing extraterritorial jurisdictional claims in environmental cases). 
61. LI JUNHAI, CHINESE ACAD. OF SOC. SCI., PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACHES TO STRENGTHEN 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA 13; see also Dan Haglund, Regulating FDI in Weak African 
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2. Home State Liability 
 Home State liability is often used as a method of last resort for 
complainants in host States who have suffered harm but have not been 
able to pursue their claims in their own nation’s courts.62 Foreign citizens 
may bring claims against Chinese corporations in Chinese courts, but 
considering the difficulty that domestic plaintiffs have collecting 
damages for environmental harms, such a suit would not be likely to 
succeed. Simply getting access to legal assistance within China from far-
off African nations would be difficult. Furthermore, procedural hurdles 
often keep plaintiffs from even making it past the pleadings stage.63 If 
plaintiffs make it to the courtroom, proving the case against the Chinese 
corporation could be impossible when the evidence needed “is in the 
hands of the [corporation] or of a host State unwilling to cooperate.”64 
Even where a plaintiff can prove liability, Chinese courts may not be 
willing to hold Chinese firms responsible in cases where major SOEs are 
involved or when foreign subsidiaries caused the destruction.65 Finally, 
courts may be reluctant to impose liability when foreign relations issues 
are involved, as they almost always are in Sino-African resource 
acquisition projects.66 
                                                                                                             
States: A Case Study of Chinese Copper Mining in Zambia, 46 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 547, 559 (2008) 
(recounting the forceful argument of a Chinese official in Zambia “that Chinese companies must 
simply follow local laws, and that responsibility for identification and sanctioning of non-
compliance should rest with the Zambian government”). 
62. PALMER, supra note 51, at 10. This is the principle that underlies the United State’s Alien 
Torts Claim Act, which provides a forum for suits alleging violations of international law by those 
who cannot obtain justice elsewhere. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (also known as the Alien Tort Stat-
ute).  
63. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 33. 
64. Id. 
65. Collecting from a Chinese parent company on judgments rendered against its foreign sub-
sidiaries poses unique problems as well. While “piercing the corporate veil” is not easy in Western 
nations, it is even more difficult in China. Under the Companies Law of 2005, the parent company is 
considered a shareholder of its subsidiaries, but it is not held liable for the subsidiary’s judgment 
debts unless two conditions are met. First, the plaintiff must show that that the parent company 
shareholder has attempted to “[evade] the payment of its debts by abusing the independent status of 
legal person or the shareholder’s limited liabilities.” Art. 20. This subjective standard of fault is 
exceptionally difficult to prove. Second, the plaintiff must show that the subsidiary’s action has 
“seriously injure[d] the interests of [a] creditor . . . .” Art. 64. This amorphous requirement is not 
only difficult to prove, but gives the judge considerable discretion in deciding whether to hold a 
parent company liable. Additionally, the creditor must also become involved in the case in order to 
prove this element. Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (China), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/statelaws/200904/t20090428_102712.htm. 
66. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 33. 
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III. LAW AND REGULATORY CONTROL OF OFDI AND OPERATIONS 
ABROAD 
 The discussion thus far has exposed some of the difficulties of 
dealing with destructive acts by multinationals in general and Chinese 
corporations in particular. The remainder of this article will examine this 
problem in the specific context of the Chinese government and related 
institutions that are involved with Chinese corporate actors around the 
globe. 
 The Chinese government already has an elaborate regulatory system 
in place to oversee foreign investments, but this system focuses primarily 
on commercial and strategic viability, rather than environmental 
oversight and enforcement. Nevertheless, with the government already 
so deeply involved in foreign investment projects, it could exercise more 
effective and meaningful oversight if it chose to do so. This section 
describes the Chinese entities involved in outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) regulation and the ways that environmental concerns 
are incorporated into their decision making. 
A. National Development and Reform Commission 
 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), an 
agency under the State Council, is a macroeconomic planning entity 
charged with managing general economic policy.67 Depending on the 
particulars of an OFDI project, it may also review and approve 
individual proposals.68 In order for the NDRC to approve a project, it 
must find that the project will comply with domestic laws, regulations, 
and policies, and “comply with the demands of sustainable development 
of the economy and society . . . .”69 Since these vague terms are 
undefined, however, such a finding may not ultimately require much by 
way of actual evidence that the project will operate sustainably. Finally, 
given NDRC’s macroeconomic focus, NDRC does not seem to 
                                                 
67. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 87. 
68. Id. at 83. 
69. Article 18 of The Interim Measures for the Administration, Examination and Approval of 
Overseas Investment Projects provides: 
 The requirements for the project that shall be examined and approved by the Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission are as follows: (1) it shall abide by the laws 
and regulations of the state and the industrial policies, not do harm to the sovereignty, 
safety and public interests of the state and not violate the rules of international law; (2) it 
shall comply with the demands of sustainable development of the economy and society 
and be helpful to the development of strategic resources required for developing the na-
tional economy . . . .   
The Interim Measures for the Administration, Examination and Approval of Overseas Investment 
Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n, Oct. 9, 2004) (China), available at 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/timftaoeaaotoip1038/. 
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emphasize environmental issues in its review process. In most respects, 
its approval process and criteria are largely similar to that of the Ministry 
of Commerce, described below, except that NDRC is less likely to delve 
into the technical details and analysis of specific projects. 
B. MOFCOM 
 The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM, or sometimes MOC) is 
responsible for “setting administrative measures and specific policies, 
guiding China’s overseas investment, approving each OFDI proposal, 
and recording OFDI data.”70 MOFCOM and NDRC’s review criteria 
may be similar, but MOFCOM tends to review projects in more specific 
detail, both with regards to economic viability and operations in the host 
country.71 Overseas investors must submit various documents disclosing 
financial details and attesting that projects will comply with local laws 
and be compatible with Chinese strategic interests. MOFCOM also 
administers a database regarding local laws in nations where Chinese 
businesses operate in an effort to help businesses succeed and comply 
with local laws.72 
 MOFCOM’s authority is further split among several departments 
tasked with overseeing different aspects of foreign economic activity. 
The Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation (DFEC) is charged 
with regulating all Chinese companies operating overseas and has the 
authority to punish corporations that violate MOFCOM regulations or 
Chinese laws.73  The Department of Foreign Aid (DFA) administers 
China’s aid projects, including concessional loans and oil-for-
infrastructure projects. In this role, DFA is responsible for approving 
Chinese contractors and “takes direct responsibility for the safety and 
quality of construction in China’s aid projects.”74 
 All this project-level involvement puts MOFCOM and its 
departments in a good position to exercise oversight of OFDI, but this 
capacity is underutilized in the environmental context for a variety of 
reasons. Most importantly, MOFCOM has incompatibly conflicting 
responsibilities because it is charged with both helping Chinese 
companies succeed in their overseas business ventures and with 
regulating them. As long as MOFCOM and the State Council’s primary 
interest continues to be economic development, regulatory enforcement 
                                                 
70. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 87. 
71. Id. at 87–88. 
72. Id. at 89, 93. 
73. Bates Gill & James Reilly, The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa, WASH. Q., Summer 
2007, at 42.  
74. Id. at 43. 
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is unlikely to emanate from MOFCOM itself in all but the most 
egregious cases. Furthermore, MOFCOM does not have direct authority 
over any of the SOEs operating abroad, so it cannot take effective action 
against these companies in most cases.75 
C. Economic and Commercial Counselor 
 The Chinese embassy in each host nation also has an Economic and 
Commercial Counselor (ECC) office that manages economic links 
between the host nation and China. The ECC has a unique role in OFDI 
policy because it is sometimes the only office in a position to oversee 
projects from beginning to end, but occupies a sort of no-man’s land in 
the bureaucracy that leaves it at once independent from oversight, yet 
powerless in its own right. On one hand, the ECC is not directly subject 
to the administrative authority of any ministry that might seek to enhance 
environmental compliance, such as MEP or MOFCOM (which does not 
have administrative authority over the ECC, in spite of their close 
relationship), so it need not enforce any other department’s decision if it 
chooses not to do so.76 On the other hand, the ECC is responsible for 
providing MOFCOM with relevant information regarding any proposed 
project,77 including an opinion regarding the proposal’s impacts “on the 
bilateral political, economic and trade relationships.”78 Yet, the ECC has 
no authority to do anything if its opinion is negative. The ECC also helps 
inform each company of the laws that apply to it in any given situation. 
This role draws significantly upon MOFCOM’s expertise with the 
financial and legal requirements in each host nation, but again ECC’s 
                                                 
75. Id. at 44–45. 
76. To those who are less familiar with the workings of Chinese bureaucracy, or who accept 
the “China, Inc.” model that portrays Chinese government and business interests as a unified force, 
this idea of competing bureaucracies may seem strange. However, the truth is that turf wars between 
ministries and with the central government are common, and regulating businesses is often more 
difficult than people presume. For further discussion of the complexities of the Chinese bureaucracy 
with regards to OFDI and the energy sector in particular, see generally Gill & Reilly, supra note 73 
and DOWNS, supra note 17 at 16–39. 
77. Under Articles 10 and 11 of The Measures for Overseas Investment Management, 
MOFCOM must solicit the ECC’s opinion regarding “the basic information on the investment and 
other relevant information” before MOFCOM can approve a proposed project. The Measures for 
Overseas Investment Management (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 16, 2009) 
(China), available at http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/200904/t20090402_202192.html. 
78. Article 11 states:  
The [economic and trade counselor’s office of the] embassy or consulate of China in the 
foreign country or region shall put forward its opinion in such respects as the security sta-
tus of the host country and the impact of the investment on the bilateral political, eco-
nomic and trade relationships, and make a reply within 10 workdays after receiving the 
letter of request for opinion.  
Id. 
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role is limited to information sharing.79 Finally, like MOFCOM, the ECC 
has no direct lines of authority over Chinese corporations in Africa.80  
 In spite of these handicaps, the ECC is in a position to observe both 
potential and actual environmental effects in projects. In fact, it is 
arguably required to do so. For example, the ECC’s assessment of 
probable trade effects could include a full report of a project’s potential 
environmental impacts since adverse effects to host nation environments 
can easily lead to strained relations. However, the ECC must file its 
opinion on the project within ten days of receiving a request from 
MOFCOM, which is not enough time to conduct a thorough 
environmental evaluation.81 Furthermore, although the ECC is tasked 
with helping Chinese corporations increase their knowledge and 
compliance with host State laws, it has neither the environmental 
expertise nor the manpower to monitor operations. The ECC office in 
Zambia, for example, had only six staff members in 2007 when the 
Chiman mining problems occurred.82 
D. SASAC 
 The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) either owns or holds a controlling share of stocks 
in all of China’s State-owned entities (SOEs).83 Because the SOEs carry 
out the vast majority of resource acquisition OFDI from China into 
Africa, SASAC is a key player in decisions regarding corporate 
operations in host nations.84 SASAC’s role is virtually indistinguishable 
from that of a typical managing shareholder in that its sole concern is in 
maximizing the economic performance of its companies.85 This gives 
SASAC every incentive to avoid costs associated with environmental 
compliance. This is particularly problematic because SASAC is not 
effectively checked by any other ministries with competing interests. As 
an organ of the State Council, SASAC’s bureaucratic ranking is 
equivalent to any of the ministries that might try to exert authority over 
SOEs, so State-owned corporations enjoy the privilege of influencing 
                                                 
79. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 93. 
80. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 45, 47; see also DOWNS, supra note 17, at 21–24 (describ-
ing some of the ways officers avoid responsibility or circumvent bureaucratic oversight). 
81. The Measures for Overseas Investment Management, supra note 77, at Art. 11. 
82. Haglund, supra note 61, at 557 (as of 2007). 
83. Id. at 42. 
84. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 44 (noting that because “[p]rovince-level SOEs make up 
approximately 88 percent of all Chinese firms investing abroad” provincial governments are key 
players “in China’s corporate engagement strategy overseas”). 
85. Id. at 42. 
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both the implementation and enforcement of regulations that affect 
them.86  
 This is not to say that SASAC thwarts every attempt to regulate 
SOE conduct. It recently issued several directives ostensibly intended to 
raise the level of SOE conduct. The Guiding Opinion on Fulfilling Social 
Responsibilities by Central Enterprises (December 2007), for example, 
sets forth lofty goals for sustainably conducting business within China, 
including establishing norms for evaluating and reporting corporate 
social responsibilities.87 The Guiding Opinion also specifically 
recognizes that good corporate citizenship is increasingly important for 
fostering international political and economic relationships and 
developing an image of responsibility for central enterprises.88
 Accordingly, many of China’s largest SOEs in Africa have adopted 
corporate codes of conduct and at least nominally committed themselves 
to international corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives like the 
U.N. Global Compact.89 Some enterprises have even implemented 
external auditing procedures that are designed to demonstrate 
compliance with international standards and meet the expectations of 
foreign investors or partners.90 While such voluntary initiatives are 
commendable, they are no substitute for effective governmental 
regulation and oversight. 
E. Financial Institutions 
 China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank (Ex-
Im Bank) are China’s two major State-owned banks that deal with 
foreign investment and aid projects. As the primary funding source for 
the kinds of development projects we have discussed, these financial 
institutions often have the most direct contact with the operating details 
of specific projects. CDB is responsible for managing the China Africa 
Development Fund, which makes approximately $5 billion available for 
increasing agricultural and manufacturing investments in ongoing 
Chinese projects in Africa.91  
                                                 
86. Id.; see also DOWNS, supra note 17, at 21–24 (discussing the relationship of the oil compa-
nies to the government). 
87. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 190–91; see also id. at 225–35 (full text of the Guiding 
Opinion). 
88. Id. at 191. 
89. UNITED NATIONS, PAMPHLET, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (2011), available 
at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/GC_brochure_FINAL.pdf. To see 
what companies are members of the Global Compact, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participa
nts/search. 
90. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 214. 
91. Id. at 117. 
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 The Ex-Im Bank, however, is the most important bank in African 
policy, holding an outstanding loan balance of at least $7 billion for 
African projects, which account for nearly twenty percent of its total 
business.92 Ex-Im Bank coordinates with MOFCOM to arrange bidding 
for all of China’s official economic aid projects, provides low-rate loans 
to African governments for aid programs, and encourages Chinese firms 
to invest in Africa through export credits and loans for overseas projects, 
often with direct support from government officials.93 The vast majority 
of these projects are in the infrastructure development sectors, including 
“dams, hydropower, thermal nuclear power plants, oil facilities, copper 
mines, and railways.”94 Ex-Im Bank reportedly made approximately $20 
billion available for further projects in Africa in 2008–2010. 
IV. THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTALLY 
RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT 
 Although the governmental structure described above does not 
appear to provide sufficient oversight, the Chinese government has 
shown an increased interest in promoting corporate environmental and 
social responsibility. Just as the government has acknowledged the need 
for better environmental protection domestically over the last decade, it 
seems to have realized that rampant destruction in African host nations is 
unsustainable as both an environmental and a commercial practice. Each 
of the governmental bodies detailed in the previous section has reason to 
help ensure that Chinese corporations conduct business in 
environmentally responsible ways, even if it comes at some expense.  
 At the national level, the Central Government has at least nominally 
recognized that it is not in China’s long term interest to allow its 
companies to wreak havoc on the environments of host nations.95 Such 
actions contribute to an already somewhat negative image of China as a 
player in the international business community, which can be damaging 
in several ways. First, wealthier Western corporations are increasingly 
conscious of public perceptions regarding their corporate 
responsibility.96 Major companies are therefore less willing to be 
associated with high profile environmental destruction, even if the 
                                                 
92. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 115. 
93. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 43. 
94. Id. 
95. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 186. 
96. See, e.g., Karin Buhmann, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Current Issues and 
Their Relevance for Implementation of Law, 22 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUD. 62, 83 (2005) (“Low 
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actions are perpetrated by suppliers or foreign partners.97 This trend 
could make it increasingly difficult for China to attract foreign 
investment and forge partnerships with the wealthy corporations that will 
help ensure China’s economic prosperity in the future.98 Developing 
environmentally responsible operations and implementing credible 
mechanisms to report on corporate responsibility can help Chinese 
suppliers and manufacturers secure and retain business from 
international customers. 
 Second, the perception that Chinese businesses are destructive to 
host nations makes it less likely that other nations will open their doors 
to Chinese corporations. This not only hurts immediate business interests 
but also affects China’s long term resource goals.99 Rampant 
environmental destruction in host nations may cause such resentment 
that foreign governments are forced to address the problems through 
more stringent regulations. In the most egregious cases, a host nation 
may react more harshly still, as Sierra Leone did when it banned timber 
exports entirely at the beginning of 2010.100 Such backlash could imperil 
long term relations with the supplier nations that are vital to China’s 
continued growth and development. So while NDRC and MOFCOM, for 
example, may not presently be interested in environmental regulation, 
they must come to realize that their common goal of increased economic 
prosperity can only be achieved by ensuring a certain level of 
responsible conduct.101 
 Accordingly, the government has adopted an active posture in 
urging corporations to conduct their operations abroad responsibly. The 
latest version of the national Company Law includes a requirement that 
                                                 
97. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 157 (quoting Chinese scholar Wang Zhile, who points out 
that “[i]international society will not apply lower standards to Chinese corporations overseas simply 
because they are from a developing country”). 
98. Id. at 162 (“[M]ultinationals may prefer to source items from suppliers deemed capable of 
implementing international standards of corporate conduct.”). 
99. DANIEL H. ROSEN & THILO HANEMANN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CHINA’S 
CHANGING OUTBOUND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROFILE: DRIVERS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS (2009) (“Shielding pariah-state governments or providing ‘no strings attached’ loans 
to the developing world might help some of the established OFDI players, but it hurts the reputation 
of China’s firms among consumers and thus harms the interest of China’s next generation of OFDI 
investors.”). 
100. While not directly blaming any specific entities for the destruction, Sierra Leone officials 
noted that “tens of millions of dollars’ worth of logs were smuggled out of the country to Middle 
Eastern and Southeast Asian countries . . . .” Rhett A. Butler, Sierra Leone Cracks Down on Illegal 
Logging by Banning Log Exports, MONGABAY, Jan. 2, 2010, http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0102-
sierra_leone.html.  
101. ROSEN & HANEMANN, supra note 99, at 12 (“Anti-Chinese sentiment in host countries 
and concerns articulated by third-country governments and nongovernmental organizations have 
forced an internal debate between the steward of China’s new-found soft power, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and those concerned only with maximizing overseas access.”). 
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companies adhere to notions of social and business morality.102 China 
has also significantly increased its participation and visibility in regional 
and international programs aimed at fostering corporate responsibility.103 
The government has focused on encouraging businesses to work 
voluntarily toward higher standards of CSR, perhaps because this “is 
easier than relying on regulations that the State lacks the administrative 
capacity to enforce and that, if enforced, would reduce global 
competitiveness.”104 There also appears to be a heightened expectation 
that companies actually make efforts to abide by the commitments of 
such programs, as opposed to simply signing onto them.105 While this 
effort is commendable in many respects, Chinese notions of CSR must 
begin to include responsible conduct in the supply chain, rather than only 
in the immediate production process. 
V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT 
A. Structural Improvement 
 The current regulatory structure may be unwieldy and inefficient, 
but it does allow the government several opportunities to review and 
regulate environmental impacts associated with OFDI. Even where the 
process currently purports to take environmental considerations into 
account, it would benefit from increased reference to objective standards. 
This final section presents an analysis of several tools that can be 
employed to help Chinese companies address environmental issues in 
foreign nations. 
1. Consolidate Oversight Authority 
 The problems of the bureaucracy described above are clear. Each of 
the bodies mentioned has a different mission and different priorities 
regarding overseas investments. SASAC seeks, for example, to 
maximize profits, just as any corporate stakeholder does.106 This purpose 
can easily conflict with the goals of MOFCOM, which is involved at the 
macro level in approving and facilitating projects that are consistent with 
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larger policy goals.107 Even within these bodies, the State Council has 
decentralized much authority to lower levels, thereby increasing the 
number of competing offices involved in OFDI approval and 
oversight.108 As a result, no single entity is responsible for evaluating and 
monitoring environmental impacts, nor is it clear who should be 
responsible for addressing issues as they arise. This systemic problem 
makes it extremely difficult to conceive of a solution within the current 
governmental structure.  
 While we recognize that it is unrealistic to expect wholesale 
changes to this bureaucracy, the preferred solution is to empower a 
single governmental body to administer and regulate the environmental 
issues associated with foreign investment projects. Just as the elevation 
of SEPA to a ministry-level body has greatly expanded its influence 
domestically,109 designating one department within the Chinese 
government to exercise control over all environmental impacts abroad 
would greatly increase the efficacy of the regulatory power. None of the 
current agencies is specifically responsible for reviewing and overseeing 
the environmental aspects of these projects, so the government should 
either establish a new department or designate an existing one to assume 
this role.  
 The best solution is to authorize a department within MEP to 
exercise authority abroad and to operate independently of the economic 
agencies that are currently involved in the process. It would be virtually 
impossible to force any real changes in corporate practices abroad 
without MEP’s involvement. MEP is the only existing ministry with the 
expertise to monitor projects in any meaningful sense. Additionally, 
MEP’s exclusive duty is to oversee environmental issues, so it is the only 
agency that could begin to counteract the influence of the economic 
agencies that currently dominate the process. Finally, MEP’s ministry-
level status makes it at least theoretically capable of exercising authority 
over the corporate entities it would regulate. If MEP were specifically 
charged with regulating foreign investment projects, it would be able to 
contend with the economic agencies’ efforts to maximize profits and 
business relationships in host nations.110  
                                                 
107. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 87.  
108. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 44 (“China relies heavily on coordination among a com-
plex array of corporations and government bureaucracies to achieve its policy objectives in Africa. 
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109. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 263. 
110. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 44 (“Finally, the interests of Chinese corporations and 
their supporting bureaucratic agencies of the Chinese government may conflict with the interests of 
other Chinese government bureaucratic actors also engaged in Africa.”). 
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 Currently, MEP is technically authorized to dispatch counselors 
abroad, but it needs the permission of both the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the State Council in order to do so.111 This impedes its 
independence and ability to maintain a presence where it is needed. MEP 
should be independently authorized to establish offices alongside the 
ECC and DFEC in the nations where Chinese businesses operate so that 
it is in a position to exercise oversight of environmental issues in these 
host nations.  
 The same enforcement difficulties that plague MEP domestically 
would be present in foreign offices on an even larger scale.112 However, 
the current situation allows corporate and economic interests to exercise 
virtually unfettered control over foreign operations. Any effort that 
brings environmental experts and policies into the foreign regulatory 
structure would be an improvement over the status quo. 
2. Meaningful Review and Oversight Within the Current Structure 
 In the absence of a newly-authorized foreign division of MEP, there 
are other ways that current bureaucratic procedures could better address 
the environmental impacts of foreign projects. Within the current 
structure, MOFCOM and its DFEC seem best-positioned to provide 
substantive environmental review of investment projects. DFEC must 
approve projects at an operational level,113 which requires it 
(theoretically, at least) to engage in an analysis of the project itself and 
the environment—both physical and legal—of its proposed location. 
DFEC also supposedly possesses the authority to punish firms that do 
not adhere to MOFCOM regulations and to Chinese law,114 so DFEC 
should be able to enforce requirements both before and during overseas 
investment projects.  
 MOFCOM already appears to be accepting increased responsibility 
for environmental issues pertaining to foreign projects, both in terms of 
information sharing and oversight. In order to help Chinese companies 
comply with local laws, MOFCOM administers a database of laws in 
every nation with which China enjoys significant economic ties, 
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including environmental laws.115 While these laws may not be rigorous 
enough to prevent environmental degradation in all situations, 
MOFCOM’s efforts at least indicate a willingness to help companies 
comply with these laws. Increased consultations between operators and 
MOFCOM officials should be encouraged so that companies can use this 
information to guide development choices.  
 More importantly, MOFCOM has begun to coordinate with other 
bodies to require more responsible corporate conduct. For example, 
SEPA (now MEP) and MOFCOM issued a circular in October 2007 that 
instituted a “green trade policy” intended to increase domestic penalties 
for Chinese enterprises that have violated environmental laws and 
regulations within China.116 Under this policy, the government has the 
power to severely restrict a business’s ability to engage in export activity 
and foreign trade if the business violates Chinese environmental 
regulations and laws.117 This sort of policy promotes cooperation 
between agencies and shows that China is capable of using trade 
restrictions as an enforcement tool against polluting industries. If a 
comparable regulation applied to industries operating outside of China, 
those firms would have increased incentives to obey the laws and behave 
responsibly. The threat of losing import/export licenses or government 
support would force businesses to take modest steps toward fulfilling 
their environmental responsibilities in foreign nations. 
 More basic goals can be achieved by requiring that 
MOFCOM/DFEC’s initial analysis include a substantial and reliable 
environmental impact assessment of every major project. Legal authority 
for this requirement arguably exists within the current Measures for 
Overseas Investment Management. Article 12 of the Measures requires 
that an array of application materials be submitted to MOFCOM for 
approval before projects begin,118 but because that Ministry’s primary 
                                                 
115. Id. at 42; OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 89. 
116. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 265. 
117. Id. 
118. Article 12 requires:  
An enterprise making any overseas investment prescribed in Article 6 or 7 of these 
Measures shall submit the following materials: 
1. an application form, which shall mainly cover the name, registered capital, 
amount of investment, scope of business and duration of business of the overseas 
enterprise, an explanation of sources of investment capital, the specific contents of 
the investment, the equity structure, the analysis and assessment of the investment 
environment, and a statement of lack of any of the circumstances prescribed in Ar-
ticle 9 of these Measures;  
2. a photocopy of the business license of the enterprise;  
3. the bylaw of the overseas enterprise and the relevant agreement or contract;  
4. the approval or filing document issued by the relevant state department;  
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focus is economic, it reviews primarily financial arrangements and 
investment conditions. However, the final subsection (Article 12, 
Section 6) gives MOFCOM the authority to require “other documents as 
specified by the competent department,” which could easily be defined 
to include an MEP-approved EIA.119 Ideally, there would be some 
mechanism for ensuring that environmental data were subject to 
independent verification. Developing a culture of compliance and 
increasing the reliability of such assessments would be no simple task, 
but any level of increased attention to environmental issues in both the 
planning and operational phases will be an improvement. 
 Additionally, Article 9 of the Measures requires MOFCOM to deny 
an application if a proposed project will damage China’s relationship 
with the host nation.120 As it becomes clearer that environmental 
destruction can damage relationships between China and the host, this 
clause should be used to reject projects that pose a serious threat to the 
environment, particularly where that threat has health implications for 
local residents.121 
3. Regulatory Standards 
 While a general re-structuring of the bureaucratic oversight 
mechanisms would permit more centralized review, increased efficiency, 
and better decision making,122 improvements are possible within the 
                                                                                                             
5. a Pre-report on Overseas Merger or Acquisition (see Annex 3 for its format) if it 
is an overseas investment in the category of merger and acquisition; and 
6. other documents as specified by the competent department . . . .  
The Measures for Overseas Investment Management, supra note 77. 
119. Id. 
120. Article 9 provides:  
Where the overseas investment of an enterprise falls under any of the following circum-
stances, the Ministry of Commerce or the provincial commerce department shall disap-
prove it: 
1. endangering the state sovereignty, national security and public interests of China 
or violating a law or regulation of China;  
 2. damaging the relationship between China and a relevant country or region;  
3. likely violating any international treaty concluded by China with a foreign party; 
or  
 4. involving any technology or goods prohibited by China from import. 
The economic and technical feasibility of an overseas investment shall be the sole re-
sponsibility of the enterprise . . . .  
Id.  
121. See, e.g., Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 46 (describing the high profile anti-Chinese 
backlash in Zambia following a deadly mine explosion in 2006). 
122. This assumes of course that the government’s intense involvement in commercial transac-
tions can deliver these benefits at all. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 89. The OECD recommends 
that the government remove its oversight authority and permit firms to make investment decisions 
based on their evaluation of the markets. 
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current system by the simple application of meaningful standards to the 
approval process. For example, there are no firm guidelines governing 
environmental impact assessments, nor is there any mechanism to allow 
third parties to review them for accuracy and completeness. Without 
third party review, there is no mechanism to verify the accuracy of 
completed project assessments.  
 In order to facilitate meaningful oversight of corporate conduct 
generally, the government must develop and support a system of 
nationally recommended standards that corporations will eventually be 
required to meet. Such standards could draw on accepted environmental 
norms and specific international standardization schemes, such as the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Companies and ISO systems. Each 
of these systems provides specific guidelines for ensuring responsible 
conduct, including due diligence and management of suppliers. Some 
8,000 companies in China have been certified as meeting ISO 14001 
standards,123 and there is increasing evidence of Chinese corporations 
referencing or working within OECD guidelines as a result of their 
global business contacts.124 This is so because OECD member State 
corporations are expected to promote conformity with OECD standards 
throughout their supply chains.125 Because China is a link in so many 
supply chains leading to Western OECD nations, its major international 
corporations have necessarily worked with their Western partners to 
raise operating standards within China. The next step is to extend these 
practices beyond China’s domestic production facilities to their 
suppliers. 
 While we should not expect China to adopt these international 
standards universally, they provide a proper starting point for developing 
a system to fit China’s needs. In order to have an effect, any guidelines 
China issues will have to be sector-specific and will have to avoid the 
kind of vague language that plagues its legal regulations. While this is a 
daunting task, China’s domestic textile industry successfully developed 
sector-specific national standards in 2006,126 which shows that such 
standards can, in fact, be created and implemented. This kind of effort 
could be mounted in the mining industry, for example, with the aid of 
international organizations like the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative and domestic coalitions like the China International Mining 
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Group.127 Industry trade groups should work with the government to 
develop meaningful standards in the sectors that Chinese companies are 
most involved in overseas because, as SEPA noted during the course of 
one such collaboration, “industrial associations are familiar with their 
own industry’s technology and management, so their participation will 
make economic policy more pertinent.”128 So long as industry is not 
empowered to entirely write its own rules, such collaboration can be 
valuable.  
 Once in place, specific standards can be used to hold companies 
accountable for their actions through several mechanisms. If the 
standards are legally binding (which is unlikely in the short to medium 
term), then companies that fail to achieve them could be punished or 
fined. More likely, perhaps, is a less stringent approach that would use 
the standards as reference points by which interested parties could 
measure a company’s social responsibility. This would help facilitate 
meaningful assessment and reporting of corporate conduct abroad and 
could have a real impact if government officials considered these reports 
when evaluating applications for further investment or expansion abroad. 
Even if such evaluations had no legal effect, public pressure would be 
more easily harnessed if an interested party could publicize specific 
shortcomings in a company’s business practices. 
4. Foreign Application of Chinese Laws 
 Another option is to extend the application of Chinese laws to 
foreign operators and subsidiaries so that these entities are subject to the 
oversight and legal authority of Chinese officials. The drawbacks and 
difficulties of implementing a system of extraterritorial application of 
home State laws are discussed in Part II.B.1, but it is nevertheless 
possible that the Chinese government will have to extend its reach 
further into foreign operations if it truly wants to confront this issue. As 
noted earlier, China and several other developing nations appear to 
increasingly expect home States to exert some control over the 
multinational corporations operating within developing host nations. 
Chinese officials should recognize that they must accept that 
responsibility if their corporations are to continue spreading across the 
globe. 
 While it will be difficult to implement such a program, many States 
have laws that apply to corporate conduct in foreign nations, so there is 
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precedent for such a legal regime.129 But even the United States does not 
require its corporations to abide by all American laws in their overseas 
operations (minimum wage requirements, for example),130 so it is 
difficult to imagine the Chinese government fully applying its domestic 
laws to operations in far-off nations such as Zambia and Sudan. 
Nevertheless, no corporation can expect its overseas operations to be 
entirely beyond the reach of its home State’s legal authority. The 
Chinese government can legitimately implement and enforce regulations 
abroad if it chooses to do so. 
 This idea has gained some support in China, and the government 
now has certain regulations that extend to corporate operations outside of 
its borders.131 The Guide on Sustainable Overseas Silviculture, for 
example, applies to “regulating and guiding the whole process of the 
overseas activities of Chinese enterprises in silviculture . . . .”132 Most 
importantly, these regulations require a thorough environmental 
assessment and a sustainability plan for all Chinese logging operations 
overseas, even when such a plan is not required by host State law.133 The 
Guidelines also urge operators to reach out to local residents by 
“establish[ing] a consultative mechanism with the local community.”134 
There is, however, no clear enforcement mechanism, nor any avenue for 
affected residents to seek enforcement or compensation if they suffer 
harm. Furthermore, the guidelines suffer from a lack of specificity, as do 
most Chinese laws. Nevertheless, the development and issuance of 
guidelines in other major industries would begin the process of extending 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to Chinese companies that operate abroad.  
 Another recent development may indicate that Chinese officials are 
moving even further toward directly applying Chinese law abroad. In the 
summer of 2009, China Daily reported that MEP and MOFCOM had 
completed a draft of mandatory measures that would set forth many of 
the legal obligations we have discussed in this article to all Chinese 
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companies involved in overseas projects.135 The regulations would 
require all companies to comply with the environmental laws of the host 
nation and, in cases where Chinese standards exceed those of the host 
nation, to meet Chinese standards.136  
 MOFCOM and MEP are apparently reviewing these guidelines for 
possible promulgation.137 If the guidelines are ultimately issued, they 
would be significant for a number of reasons. Companies would be 
forced to pay more attention to the legal requirements of the sector in 
which they operate or risk violating Chinese law. Companies would 
hopefully be more likely to comply because they are more familiar with 
the Chinese laws that apply to their particular business and might be 
more concerned if penalties were assessed at home rather than in the host 
State. The real effect on conduct in host countries may not be as 
substantial as one might hope given the low standards of both host and 
Chinese laws, but the fact that the government is considering this matter 
seriously is important in itself. If these regulations become part of 
Chinese corporate law they could have a real effect on the ground. 
B. The Role of Financial Institutions 
 Financial institutions are also well positioned to encourage more 
environmentally responsible conduct. Chinese banks appear to have 
recognized this in recent years, but they must begin to move beyond 
cursory policy statements and implement recognized international 
standards to ensure that the projects they fund are not overly 
destructive.138 
1. Lending Standards that Reference Environmental Issues 
 International banks and institutions currently use several sets of 
lending criteria to evaluate the potential social and environmental 
impacts of proposed projects. While traditional banks and lending 
institutions typically use the Equator Principles (EP) to evaluate aid 
projects, the World Bank’s IFC uses its Performance Criteria.139 Both 
systems employ specific standards to evaluate projects with respect to 
pollution prevention, greenhouse gas emissions, management of 
                                                 
135. Li Jing, Green Rules Eye Chinese Firms Abroad, CHINA DAILY, May 29, 2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-05/29/content_7952605.htm. 
136. Id. There are also provisions requiring companies to compensate nations and/or victims 
for environmental damage they inflict, but no information on how that might be calculated is yet 
available. The draft also includes provisions mandating environmental impact assessments, mitiga-
tion strategies, and adherence to all environmental treaties to which China is a party. 
137. Jing, supra note 135. 
138. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 91. 
139. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 169. 
374 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:343 
hazardous wastes, and biodiversity protection.140 If a proposal does not 
satisfy the criteria, the lending institution is expected to deny funding.141 
If a project is approved, frequent consultations between lenders, 
corporations, and independent experts help firms respond to 
environmental and social concerns early in the planning process when it 
is still feasible to adjust the project to avoid the identified problems.142  
  Such standards are now routine in the international project finance 
market.143 However, China’s banks have not embraced the standards as 
fully as Western banks.144 Banks in China do not face the degree of 
social pressure and criticism that Western banks associated with 
environmentally destructive projects tend to receive.145 Publicly-listed 
Western institutions are typically subject to various disclosure 
requirements that allow shareholders and regulators to monitor CSR 
activities. The majority of Chinese lenders (including, most importantly, 
Ex-Im Bank) are not subject to rigorous disclosure requirements, so they 
feel neither social nor legal pressure to avoid potentially destructive 
projects.146 
 The central government has recently pressured banks to pay more 
attention to the environmental effects of the projects they finance in 
order to enhance China’s image as a socially responsible business 
partner.147 As a result, some positive steps have occurred to improve 
consultation at the lending stage. In the domestic arena, beginning in the 
mid-1990s, “the People’s Bank of China adopted a policy of refusing to 
extend credit to firms that did not correctly dispose of their industrial 
waste or that failed to meet State standards for environmental 
protection.”148 Moreover, in July 2007, SEPA, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC), and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
implemented the “green credit policy,” establishing systemic links 
between environmental protection agencies and credit administration 
institutions.149 The “green credit policy” allows banks “to suspend or 
limit loans to enterprises violating environmental laws.”150 The OECD 
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reported that in the first year of the program’s existence, SEPA 
“provided more than 30,000 pieces of information on violation[s] of 
environmental laws to the Credit Information System Bureau” so that 
commercial banks could implement the policy and begin restricting 
funds.151 One year later, SEPA signed an agreement with the IFC to help 
introduce the Equator Principles domestically. However the criteria are 
not slated to apply to overseas projects, and Ex-Im has not fully adopted 
the EPs.152  
 Currently, the “green credit policy” only applies to firms operating 
within China.153 The green credit system should expand to include 
foreign operations in at least two ways. First, if a Chinese firm has 
previously violated the environmental laws of a host nation, lenders 
should refuse to extend credit to that firm and its subsidiaries. Second, 
Chinese firms with excessive violations of Chinese law domestically 
should not receive financing to establish or invest in foreign operations. 
Responsible authorities need to establish a system for disclosing 
information on companies who violate laws overseas in order to make 
such a system successful. Ex-Im Bank must be covered in order for the 
policy to have any meaningful effect. 
 Among credit exporting banks, both Ex-Im and CDB have 
increased the visibility of their CSR initiatives over the last couple of 
years. A member of the U.N. Global Compact since 2006, CDB claims it 
has made significant improvements in monitoring and reporting the 
environmental impacts of the projects that it finances.154 On at least one 
occasion, CDP hired Det Norske Veritas, a leading international 
classification and compliance organization, to audit its reports and 
initiatives.155 
 Although not a member of the Global Compact, Ex-Im Bank 
increasingly publicizes its own efforts to incorporate environmental 
standards into its project review process.156 Though many of its policies 
arguably lack the necessary detail to guide decision makers in evaluating 
proposals, they nevertheless indicate the bank’s willingness to begin 
incorporating environmental concerns into its lending process. Ex-Im 
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Bank also retains authority to discontinue funding if negative 
environmental impacts occur during the life of a project,157 but it is 
doubtful that this extreme remedy has been utilized. Finally, the policy 
requires a post-project review to evaluate the accuracy of the EIA and 
address outstanding concerns.158  
 While these policies are laudable (and similar on their face to IFC’s 
policies), the amount of damage done by Ex-Im-funded projects suggests 
that the policies are not enforced in practice. Because the Ex-Im policies 
are strictly internal,159 the bank suffers no real harm if it fails to abide by 
them. Equally importantly, there are no assurances regarding the 
accuracy of assessments or effectiveness of mitigation measures. Even if 
a host nation approves the assessments, the approval may be meaningless 
if the investing firm has underestimated or underreported potential 
environmental impacts, or if financial pressures compel the host nation 
to sign off on destructive projects. The IFC addresses this problem by 
providing opportunities for independent experts with no financial stake 
in the outcome to analyze projects before funds are disbursed.160 The 
Chinese lending process should include a similar review. In order to play 
an effective role, lenders must adopt more specific and meaningful 
guidelines for environmental review and implement mechanisms to 
ensure compliance. 
2. Enforcement of Standards Through the Contract 
 Beyond assessments and simple reporting, financial institutions can 
enforce substantive requirements on projects they fund through 
contractual stipulations and contingent funding. For example, the IFC 
requires projects it funds to establish a reporting process that local 
citizens can use to file complaints and an independent oversight office 
(the Compliance Adviser/Ombudsmen, or CAO) with authority to 
monitor active projects.161 The CAO fields complaints from local 
citizens, makes site visits to determine compliance with lending 
standards, and exercises authority by limiting or placing conditions on 
continued financing.162 If problems develop or complaints are received, 
the IFC works with the borrower to implement a timetable for meeting 
the expected standards, and the IFC may suspend or even withdraw 
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funding if the situation warrants it.163 Ex-Im Bank and other Chinese 
lending institutions should require similar mechanisms to field 
complaints regarding Chinese projects in foreign nations, perhaps in 
connection with ECC offices. 
 A more effective solution would emphasize the inclusion of 
stipulated operating standards in the lending contract as a condition of 
receiving continued funding for a project. Early in the stages of project 
planning, the IFC uses consultations between operators, environmental 
experts, and lenders to develop firm agreements on operating standards 
for individual projects based on the specifics of each venture and the 
local environment.164 Chinese lending institutions should follow this 
model as well. As specific plans develop in the lending stages of a 
project, the details should be reduced to writing and included in the 
lending agreement as definitive operating standards. The operating 
standards become an enforceable term of the contract that must be met in 
order to continue receiving funding. Incorporating fixed standards for 
pollutant levels, for example, would contractually bind the borrower to 
stay within the permitted levels. 
 The loan agreement should also reserve monitoring rights to a third 
party, such as a local environmental NGO, to help ensure that the 
company abides by the stipulations. This will keep banks out of the 
business of monitoring environmental impacts and give that power to a 
party whose sole interest is monitoring the environmental impacts with 
reference to the contractual standards. Furthermore, the contracts should 
include more creative provisions to address other unique problems, such 
as granting standing to third parties or jurisdiction to specific tribunals to 
enforce the terms of the contract in the event of a breach. 
3. Financial Markets and Exchanges 
 Securities and stock exchanges can also help raise the 
environmental standards of companies whose shares and commodities 
they manage. There are institutional and practical reasons for this. As a 
practical matter, public companies—even those that are held largely 
under State control—must maintain at least some level of transparency, 
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corporate governance, and social responsibility in order to attract 
investors. As noted, investors are increasingly reluctant to associate with 
environmentally irresponsible companies.165 Companies who want to 
attract wealthy investors, particularly those from Western nations, must 
act responsibly. This requires companies not only to institute policies to 
prevent environmental harm abroad, but also to foster a culture of 
compliance by developing methods to report and publicize CSR efforts. 
Several Chinese banks have undertaken such initiatives in connection 
with their transformations into joint stock companies and IPO 
offerings.166  
 Chinese market regulators have the power to establish disclosure 
and corporate governance requirements and have done so with regard to 
accounting procedures, record authentication, and other internal 
processes.167 For example, the national Accounting Law now requires 
listed companies to comply with the Ministry of Finance’s Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises, which are largely consistent with the 
International Financial Accounting Standards.168 By requiring Chinese 
companies to adhere to these internationally-recognized principles, the 
government has forced them to raise their standard of corporate 
governance and has begun cultivating a fledgling culture of compliance.  
 A few policies indicate that this mechanism is becoming more 
popular domestically. SEPA’s 2008 “green securities policy,” for 
example, requires companies in heavily polluting industries to submit to 
an environmental audit and disclose environmental information prior to 
issuing an IPO or refinancing through a securities market.169 Local 
exchanges have issued even more proactive directives designed to 
promote responsible corporate conduct. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
for example, issued its Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed 
Companies in September 2006 and has been helping the 488 companies 
listed on its exchange learn how to apply them.170 The guidelines instruct 
listed companies to “formulate environmental protection policies” and 
devote resources to establishing, implementing, and improving systems 
to protect the environment wherever the companies operate.171 
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Companies are supposed to ensure that their environmental protection 
procedures facilitate compliance with the relevant laws, reduce resource 
consumption and waste, and minimize adverse impacts.172 Significantly, 
Article 30 requires companies to report their pollution discharges to the 
proper authorities and pay any fines if they violate local laws.173  
 While the effectiveness of these provisions is open for debate in 
light of the significant shortcomings in oversight and regulation of 
polluting industries within China, it is noteworthy that individual 
exchanges are stepping forward to institute their own requirements for 
corporate environmental responsibility. OECD reports that the Shenzhen 
guidelines have had at least some impact domestically,174 implying that 
the guidelines could be even more useful if foreign conduct is 
increasingly considered part of a company’s overall CSR profile. An 
enforcement mechanism would be ideal since the effectiveness of the 
non-mandatory guidelines is necessarily limited. Companies require 
large amounts of capital to conduct operations overseas. Therefore, if 
listed companies face the real possibility of sanctions in the form of 
limited or suspended trading, owners and investors will have sufficient 
incentive to raise their environmental standards in foreign operations. 
C. Actions by Third Party Governments 
 Given the difficult nature of changing the system from within 
China, outside pressures may be needed to raise the level of responsible 
Chinese corporate conduct. Some nations have attempted to deal with 
illegal or destructive resource acquisition by controlling the products that 
can be imported into their nations. The European Union has, for 
example, implemented laws to address illegally harvested timber.175 
While such actions may draw criticism,176 they can have an effect on 
behavior by shifting enforcement responsibility from an unwilling host 
nation to an interested importing nation. 
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1. The Lacey Act 
 The U.S. Lacey Act177 was initially drafted to prevent trade in 
endangered animals but has been expanded to include trade in products 
derived from illegally harvested foreign wood.178 Under the Act, 
American importers and producers are barred from dealing in any wood 
products harvested in violation of the producing nation’s laws.179 The 
Act applies regardless of whether the foreign law imposes civil or 
criminal penalties, and even if the law itself is not actively enforced in 
the producing nation.180 All imported wood products must be labeled 
with a description of the scientific name of any wood used in the 
product, the value and quantity of each, and the name of the country 
from which it was harvested.181  
 However, this documentation is not sufficient on its own. The 
Lacey Act imposes strict liability: importers are strictly liable for 
possessing products made from illegally harvested wood,182 though they 
may be found less culpable depending on the degree of due diligence.183 
The main problem with the system is that host State laws may not be 
particularly rigorous. No matter how lax a producing State’s laws may 
be, the Lacey Act does not impose liability if producers comply with 
those laws.184 
 Nevertheless, the Lacey Act is a good example of a third-party 
government requiring companies to take responsibility for the actions of 
their suppliers. More than simply requiring a paper trail, it imposes 
investigative responsibilities on anyone wishing to import wood or wood 
products into the largest consumer market in the world. This is crucial 
because a paper trail is not enough to ensure real compliance with host 
laws when forgery is commonplace.185 Rather, importers must 
investigate and develop relationships with suppliers that they trust to 
comply with local laws.186 
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2. Supply Chain Tracking for Other Resources 
 The question is whether the United States (or any other importing 
nation) can create a similar system to monitor the metals and minerals 
that Chinese corporations are acquiring in Africa. The unreliability and 
uncertainty of record keeping within the Chinese supply chains poses an 
initial hurdle. Many producers have very little knowledge or interest in 
keeping up with the source of their raw materials.187  
  Moreover, even if supply chain tracking is possible in the wood 
industry, a system dealing with metals and minerals would entail 
additional practical difficulties. The ability to track shipments to their 
source, in particular, would be lost. Whereas a supplier can label a wood 
shipment with a scientific name and source location at the time of 
harvesting, the same may not be true of metals, which are smelted and 
blended together soon after extraction in order to be sent to China for use 
as wires or other components in countless factories across the country. It 
may be impossible to examine a product or even a shipment of a single 
type of ore to verify that it came from a particular source and was 
extracted legally, much less sustainably. 
 Despite these inherent difficulties, supply chain tracking and due 
diligence requirements may still prove useful. Supply chain tracking 
would force companies to keep records and pay some level of attention 
to the source of their raw materials. Such a system could be implemented 
piecemeal and build upon the kinds of reporting procedures that are 
already in place for wood products and human rights issues. 
Furthermore, supply chain tracking could occur without requiring much, 
if any, Chinese government involvement, as Western MNCs would be 
urged or required to participate by the governments and organizations of 
their home countries. As records are kept more universally, MNCs and 
international NGOs should be better able to monitor source conditions 
and publicize shortcomings. Whether or not there are legal repercussions 
for failing to report, increased attention and negative publicity could be 
very effective tools for pressuring Western businesses to use suppliers 
with higher standards. This system could eventually evolve into a more 
complete legal regime to foster due diligence regarding supply chains 
that include metals or minerals imported from China and elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
 The relationship between African nations and China has the 
potential to benefit both parties greatly. But the projects that have the 
potential both to help lift African nations out of poverty and to fuel the 
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Chinese business machine must involve some level of environmental 
awareness and responsibility. This article has discussed the shortcomings 
and opportunities that exist in the Chinese-African OFDI process and 
how the process could be changed to further incorporate environmental 
considerations. Most importantly, this article has suggested some ways 
to improve the process without adversely affecting the parties’ goals. 
None of the suggestions we make would significantly curb trade or 
impose undue hardship on businesses. We hope that by fostering a 
system that protects long-term interests while facilitating short-term 
acquisitions, the Chinese-African relationship can contribute to the 
development of these two vital regions in a way that is mutually 
beneficial and environmentally and economically sustainable. 
